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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as a part of the MSs in Transnational and European 
Commercial Law, Banking Law, Arbitration/Mediation at the International Hellenic 
University.  
The reason behind my topic choice is the difference and the importance of the 
financial system. As it is commonly argued, the financial system represents a heart of 
the modern market economy. When the system functions well, it allocates resources 
in a way that boosts the productivity of the economy. However, it is also unstable and 
fragile and when it falls, the impact spreads through the whole economy.  
In the heart of the financial system are banks which have prominent role in functioning 
of the economy. However, banks are prone to a contagion and domino effect as there 
is a possibility that many depositors will want their money back at the same time and 
bank will not be able to repay them, making a panic among depositors and eventually 
a “bank run”. As banks are highly interconnected and have large and significant 
exposures to other banks, the failure of one bank can have an impact on the others as 
well.  
The occurrence of crisis in financial system is not unusual and represents norm and not 
exception. Most crisis usually begin with a bubble where a particular asset rises above 
the fundamental underlined value. In addition, together with crisis goes excessive 
accumulation of debt and excessive growth in the supply of credit. This boom usually 
comes as a consequence of lax supervision, deregulation and loose monetary policy of 
central banks.  
This paper considers causes and consequences of the recent financial crisis as well as 
the post-crisis regulation which was brought as an answer to the crisis with an aim to 
prevent future disasters.  
In addition, I would also like to acknowledge my supervisor Dr. Nikoletta Kleftouri. 
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Introduction 
The last financial crisis which startled the global economy represents the most severe 
financial crisis since the Great Depression. The crisis which began as the subprime crisis 
in the U.S. shortly after spread to other economies through the combination of direct 
exposure to subprime assets, global financial imbalances and overall loss of confidence 
in the financial system. Consequently, the ongoing crisis damaged global economy and 
triggered worldwide recession.  
  
At the beginning, crisis did not look too differently than previous ones. Namely, many 
creditors at the same time pursued the return of their asset, the phenomenon known 
as “bank run”. However, the difference was that this crisis was focused on “shadow 
banking system” and there was an enormous asymmetry of information as general 
public was not aware nor did understand the complex transactions and institutions.1  
 
The germs of the crisis can be found in free-market fundamentalism in which reforms 
loosen banking regulation established after the Great Depression. During this time, 
banks found a way to evade the remaining rules and the shadow banking system was 
growing outside of the regulatory oversight. In the environment of low interest rate 
and lax regulation, the financial institutions embraced securitisation. The securitisation 
was not an innovation of this period as it was existing for many years before. However, 
it flourished in this environment. The shift from the “originate to hold” to “originate to 
distribute” model transferred the risk from bank to a third party, which led to loosen 
credit standards and indifference to perform a due diligence. In addition, banks 
created a compensation schemes, such as bonuses, which were encouraging the 
excessive risk taking.  
 
One important factor of this crisis was the international interconnection. In particular, 
the big crises have one common characteristic: they do not respect national 
boundaries. In particular, they can begin anywhere and spread globally as problems of 
one country can surface elsewhere or problems of one country can spread through 
channels such as commodities, currencies, derivatives and trade.2  
Moreover, Central Banks around the world followed the trend and had loosen easy-
money policy which fostered many housing bubbles and they all showed the same 
appetite for risk and took plenty of leverage, investing in financial innovations.  
When the problems started building up to the breaking point, the governments found 
themselves in a difficulty as many institutions were too big to fail or to interconnected 
to fail as their bankruptcy would lead to problems in larger economy. In order to 
prevent the collapse of financial system, central banks and governments all over the 
 
1Page Antony. (2014). Revisiting the Causes of the Financial Crisis. Florida 
International University College of Law: e-Collections; Available from: 
https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1387&context=faculty_publ
ications 
2 Roubini Nouriel and Mihm Stephen. (2010). Crisis Economics, A Crash Course in The 
Future of Finance. New York: The Penguin Press; 
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world provided a financial support in the form of capital infusion, asset purchase 
programs, guarantees or liquidity assistance. As a consequence, trillions of dollars 
were spent on the bail out of the financial sector all over the world. 
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1. The roots of the crisis 
The roots of this crisis can be found in the prior regulatory framework, low interest 
rate policy, the appetite of Asian central banks for debt securities and an overall 
feeling that the boom and bust cycles are left in the past and that economy will only 
experience growth. 
1.1 Deregulation 
The financial deregulation represents one of the key factors which set the path to the 
crisis. Namely, crisis brought into focus inadequacy of financial regulation at both 
national and global level as it created an environment in which mortgage lending was 
expanding and risk was increasing.  
The number of regulated bodies are responsible for regulation of financial sector and is 
stated as one of the most regulated sectors. Therefore, the failure came as a surprise 
as especially after the Great Depression regulators were dedicated to build strong 
international prudential standards. One of the reasons could be the fact that banking 
regulation is different than other kinds of regulations. For instance, in the antitrust 
there is a mutual agreement that a problem is monopoly and its necessary to regulate 
it. However, when it comes to banking regulation things are different. In this case 
there is no a mutual agreement on which problem should be solved. Is it panic, 
contagion, or value of assets?3 Furthermore, at that time, many believed that there is 
no a problem to be tackled. 
The aftermath of every crisis goes hand in hand with regulatory reforms and 
contemplation of what should be done in order to prevent another crisis. The Great 
Depression, the mother of all financial crisis, was not exception. After the almost 
financial death experience, radical reforms were brought internationally. The aim of 
these reforms was to ensure stability of financial sector, support growth and prevent 
another disaster.  
In the United States was brought the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 which established a 
division ‘’firewall’’ between commercial and investment banking and gave the Federal 
Reserve the power to regulate bank reserves. Hence, the intermediary function of 
dealing with corporate shares and bonds was reserved for investment banks while 
deposit banks were prohibited from underwriting and placing corporate stocks and 
bonds and from holding speculative assets. Therefore, the commercial bank loans 
were to meet mainly short-term financing needs while investments banks were able to 
manage the long-term financing needs. Moreover, Regulation Q put limits on deposit 
interest rates in order to limit excessive competition among banks and to ensure low 
loan rates. Furthermore, the Securities Acts of 1933 regulated the security market and 
 
3 Franklin Allen, Carletti Elena. (2010). An Overview of the Crisis: Causes, 
Consequences and Solutions. Willey Online Library. Available from: 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2443.2009.01103.x 
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created the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) which role was to regulate a 
secondary market.4 
However, the implementation of the new regulation can have benefits and drawbacks. 
The benefit is clearly that it can prevent future crises. However, the strict regulation 
can also prevent a financial system of doing its own task of allocating resources were 
needed, decelerating growth and efficiency. Hence, in 1960s and 1970s through series 
of events it was made clear that there were needed changes and financial 
liberalization. Particularly was important when economy entered in the period of 
stagnation with increasing rate of inflation which was followed with the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods international financial system. This system was depending on a stable 
rate of inflation as banks could tolerate low interest rates and finance long-term loans 
with short term deposits without high risk of maturity mismatch as long as the inflation 
stayed in check.5 However, increasing inflation pushed real interest rates down and 
lowered the profitability of commercial banks.  
Furthermore, since 1960s there was an expansion of a merger trend. However, the 
Glass-Steagall Act was keeping commercial banks away from this tendency. Thus, when 
the huge conglomerates started searching abroad for markets, US commercial banks 
started moving abroad in order to meet these conglomerates’ requirements. Also, 
increasement of price of oil in 1970s gave opportunity for the countries which 
produced oil to “recycle” the vast amount of “petrodollars” through banks in Europe 
and United States.6 Hence, the success of the industrial firms and the increased power 
of the financial institutions created a push toward deregulation.  
The first part of the deregulation wave brought that the interest rate controls were 
abolished in 1980. Furthermore, in 1999 was brought the Financial Modernization Act 
which allowed diversification of financial activities by financial institutions. In addition, 
the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act, which was separating the work of commercial and 
investment banks, was repealed in 1999 by the Graham-Leach-Bliley Act. The 
Commodity Futures Modernization Act, brought in 2000, left credit default swaps 
(CDS) and equity default swaps (EDS) unregulated. Moreover, the amendment to the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act from 2000 gave a permission for pensions 
to buy mortgage-backed securities and asset-backed securities, which consequently 
 
4 Orhangazi Özgür. (2014). Working paper series, No 49: Financial deregulation and the 
2007-08 US financial crisis. Financialisation, Economy, Society & Sustainable 
Development. FESSUD Project. Available from: http://fessud.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2013/04/Financial-deregulation-and-the-2007-08-US-financial-crisis-
Working-Paper-49.pdf 
5 Orhangazi Özgür. (2014). Working paper series, No 49: Financial deregulation and the 
2007-08 US financial crisis. Financialisation, Economy, Society & Sustainable 
Development. FESSUD Project. Available from: http://fessud.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2013/04/Financial-deregulation-and-the-2007-08-US-financial-crisis-
Working-Paper-49.pdf 
6 Orhangazi Özgür. (2014). Working paper series No 49: Financial deregulation and the 
2007-08 US financial crisis. Financialisation, Economy, Society & Sustainable 
Development. FESSUD Project. Available from: http://fessud.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2013/04/Financial-deregulation-and-the-2007-08-US-financial-crisis-
Working-Paper-49.pdf 
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increased the demand for securitized assets. Taxes on the finance capital were also 
reduced on the new pension and investment funds in order to create motivations for 
small investors’ participation. In 2004 the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) brought a special ruling for five largest investment banks in the United States to 
reduce their capital reserves which gave them the opportunity to become even more 
leveraged enterprises and to increase the pool of assets under their control. Moreover, 
these banks could alone asses and analyze their own riskiness by using computer 
models. Consequently, they were able to in few years jointly control $4 trillion in 
financial assets but with relatively little net quality.7  
Across the ocean, European Union had partly harmonized legislation framework for 
financial regulation. The European Union had adopted Directives covering banks such 
as the first Capital Requirement Directive from 2006. In this period, however, 
Directives were more dominant than Regulations. Regulations, which are directly 
implemented without a need for national transpositions, were exceptions in period 
prior to 2007.8  
During this period, Member States still had a considerable autonomy when it comes to 
regulating financial policies. Moreover, the implementation of rules whether they 
were brought independently or through transposition of EU Directive was the 
responsibility of national authorities such as banking and insurance supervisors and 
securities regulators but with a pattern of institutional architecture and regulatory 
enforcement differing from country to country.9 
1.1.1 The role of the Basel Accord  
The first attempt to regulate the banking system internationally was the Basel Accord. 
The Basel Committee on the banking supervision was established in 1974 with an aim 
to come up with better ways to regulate and supervise banking system. The first Basel 
Capital Accord was released to banks in 1988 and required from them to differentiate 
between different classes of assets they held in order to assess the risk posed by 
holding them. Therefore, the necessary capital that bank had to hold was depending 
on this risk assessment and were required to maintain minimum 8 % of their risk-
weighted assets. However, banks found a way to hide a risk that Basel I did not 
anticipate by securitizing assets which gave them the opportunity to have a stability on 
the balance sheet which, in reality, they did not have.10 
 
7Congleton D. Roger. (2010). The Political Economy of the Financial Crisis of 2008.  
In: Kolb W. Robert. Lessons from the Financial Crisis (Robert W. Kolb Series) 
[eBook]. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc, Chapter 4. Available from: 
Kindle Edition 
8 Véron Nicolas. (2018). Financial services policy since 2007: Crisis, Responses and 
Prospects. Bruegel. Available from: https://bruegel.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/06/WP06_2018_FINAL2.pdf 
9 Véron Nicolas. (2018). Financial services policy since 2007: Crisis, Responses and 
Prospects. Bruegel. Available from: https://bruegel.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/06/WP06_2018_FINAL2.pdf 
10 Roubini Nouriel and Mihm Stephen. (2010). Crisis Economics, A Crash Course in 
The Future of Finance. New York: The Penguin Press, Chapter 8 
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Therefore, in 2006 was brought the second version of the Basel accord known as Basel 
II. The new framework was based on three pillars: minimum capital requirement, 
supervisory review and market discipline. Also, it gave more technical guidelines on 
how to weight the relative risk of various assets and suggested methods of calculation. 
Moreover, it broadened the definition of risk including some other perils such as the 
likelihood that the asset’s price will fall in the open market. Furthermore, it urged 
regulators to have more aggressively approach when it comes to monitoring 
compliance with capital requirements.  
However, the Basel Accord had serious flaws. Firstly, it was not implemented in the 
USA during subprime blooming nor did apply to non-bank lenders, investment banks or 
rating agencies.11 Also, the Basel Accord, even though tried to standardize capital 
requirements, contributed to the housing bubble. In particular, the Basel legitimized 
the SIVs by allowing them to be considered separate from the balance sheet of the 
bank that operated them. Moreover, it also encouraged banks to hold securities 
backed by residential mortgages, including subprime mortgages. The reason behind 
this lays in the basic rule in the Basel Accord which states that the capital which bank 
needs to hold is depending on the risk weight of assets and, as in many countries there 
was a low record of loss of residential mortgages it gave a lower risk weight to 
securities backed by mortgages relative to other types of assets.12  
Financial regulation of this period was not equipped to see the risk. Financial 
supervisors were too occupied with the formal banking sector that did not foresee the 
excessive buildup of a risk in the shadow banking system. On the one hand there was 
an increase of integrated global financial system while on the other hand there was 
still a strong impact of national institutions to the institutional governance.13 
Moreover, regulation failed to consider the risk of interaction between regulated and 
unregulated institutions and markets. 
The national regulators interpreted Basel I in such a way that it allowed banks to hold 
hundreds of billions of dollars of securities and fund them with short-term commercial 
papers without needing to commit much of their capital. Hence, the Basel II was 
brought which required off balance sheet risk to be brought into bank’s account. 
However, it let the banks to apply their own models of risk weighting and decide alone 
how large their capital buffer should be.14 
Basel II placed accents on self-regulation, disclosure and transparency. Both Basel 
Accords treasured the principle of ‘’home country rules”. Therefore, banks from lax 
 
11 Gwinner B. William, Sanders B. Anthony. (2010). The Subprime Crisis: Implications 
for Emerging Markets. In: Kolb W. Robert. Lessons from the Financial Crisis (Robert 
W. Kolb Series) [eBook]. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc, Chapter 69. 
Available from: Kindle Edition 
12 Baily N. Martin, Litan E. Robert, Johnson S. Matthew. (2010). The Origins of the 
Financial Crisis. In: Kolb W. Robert. Lessons from the Financial Crisis (Robert W. 
Kolb Series) [eBook]. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc, Chapter 11.  
13 Bieri S. David. (2010). Regulation and Financial Stability in the Age of Turbulence. 
In: Kolb W. Robert. Lessons from the Financial Crisis (Robert W. Kolb Series) 
[eBook]. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc, Chapter 41. 
14Kolb W. Robert. (2010). Lessons from the Financial Crisis (Robert W. Kolb Series) 
[eBook]. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
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areas of supervision were free to operate according to their domestic norms in 
American and European markets.15 
It is argued that there are three crucial failures in the then existing banking regulation. 
Firstly, regulation was more focus on how to limit individual bank’s risk in insolation 
from the risk of the financial system as whole. Secondly, it did not have good answer 
for cyclical adjustments. The problem was that because long periods of low goods and 
services inflation underestimated risk and reduced the statistical measure of risk which 
ultimately brought to the excessive risk taking and bubbles. Thirdly, existed regulations 
were not enforced in an effective manner and many were on the voluntary base and 
were not implemented in all countries.16 
1.2 The Great Moderation 
The years prior to the crisis are named by leading academics and commentators as the 
period of Great Moderation. This period refers to the decline in macroeconomic 
volatility over the last 25 years, after the crises in 1970s and 1980s.17 This period can 
be sum up as a period of low inflation, economic growth and mild recession. Notably, 
Great Moderation was not only the U.S phenomenon as it was occurring at the same 
time in many other advanced economies. 
In the post war period, the world would experience boom and bust cycles. Namely, 
economies would experience high growth (the boom) with which would also come 
inflation. After inflation the economies would slow down and sometime go to 
recession (the bust). It seemed as this business cycles cannot be put in permanent 
control.  
The basic foundation for the Great Moderation were reduced inflation and 
establishment of basic price stability. The economists have proposed three possible 
reasons behind this phenomenon: structural changes in the economy, improved 
economic policies and good luck.18 For structural changes it was referred to the use of 
computers in order to get more accurate business decision, increased openness to 
trade and shift toward services and advances in the financial system. Moreover, it was 
stressed the improved economic policy which helped to overcome the large boom and 
bust cycles which were happening in the past. 
There was a common thought that the boom and bust cycles are over and that the 
economy is now experiencing stability and growth. Furthermore, there was decline of 
prices globally. In particular, the prices of commodities, energy and manufactured 
 
15Kolb W. Robert. (2010). Lessons from the Financial Crisis (Robert W. Kolb Series) 
[eBook]. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc;  
16Kaufman G. George, Malliaris A.G. (2010). The Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 
Missing Financial Regulation or Absentee Regulators?. In: Kolb W. Robert. Lessons 
from the Financial Crisis (Robert W. Kolb Series) [eBook]. Hoboken, New Jersey: John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc, Chapter 42.  
17Verick Sher, Islam Iyanatul. (2010). The Great Recession of 2008-2009: Causes, 
Consequences and Policy Responses. The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). 
Available from: http://ftp.iza.org/dp4934.pdf 
18 Hakkio S. Craig. (2013). The Great Moderation. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas 
City. Federal Reserve History. Available from: 
https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/great_moderation 
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goods fell, while the asset price was rising. Due to financial innovation and 
deregulation, banks started exploring into, until then non-traditional area for banks, 
real estate lending.19 
Financial institutions were encouraged to take riskier investments as they believed 
that there will not be any economic downturn. Also, during this period there was a 
growth of complex financial derivatives such as credit default swaps. This period 
brought an underestimation of a risk and belief that the prices will only rise and that 
the low levels of macroeconomic volatility will only continue which was a great factor 
in the build-up to the crisis.20 
1.3 The Asian Financial Crisis 
One of the important factors which contributed to the global financial crisis were the 
global imbalances. Global imbalances refer primarily to excessive saving by surplus 
countries, especially by China and excessive consumption by deficit countries, led by 
USA.21  
In 1997 many Asian countries, such as South Korea, Indonesia and Thailand, were 
faced with serious economic difficulties. Therefore, in seeking for help they turned to 
the IMF. However, in order to provide them with financial assistance, the IMF imposed 
harsh policies on Asian countries and asked them to raise their interest rates and cut 
government spending. The possible reason behind is that Asian economy at that time 
was not as important as today and did not have an effective mechanism to protest and 
argue.22Consequently, Asian countries realized that they need to become economically 
independent in order not to ask again IMF for the help in the future crisis. In order to 
become economically independent, they started accumulating trillions of dollars of 
assets.23 This led to the capital flows from emerging economies to advanced 
economies. Consequently, countries which issued the preferred reserve currency 
experienced capital inflow. As the preference for dollar reserves were coming from 
Asia, the net capital inflows from Asia to the US grown rapidly and this phenomenon 
which is related to the asset price inflation in the USA, is known as the “savings glut”.24 
 
19 Roubini Nouriel and Mihm Stephen. (2010). Crisis Economics, A Crash Course in 
The Future of Finance. New York: The Penguin Press, Chapter 1. 
20 Verick Sher, Islam Iyanatul. (2010). The Great Recession of 2008-2009: Causes, 
Consequences and Policy Responses. The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). 
Available from: http://ftp.iza.org/dp4934.pdf 
21 Verick Sher, Islam Iyanatul. (2010). The Great Recession of 2008-2009: Causes, 
Consequences and Policy Responses. The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). 
Available from: http://ftp.iza.org/dp4934.pdf 
22 Franklin Allen, Carletti Elena. (2010). An Overview of the Crisis: Causes, 
Consequences and Solutions [Internet]. Willey Online Library. Available from: 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2443.2009.01103.x 
23 Franklin Allen, Carletti Elena. (2010). An Overview of the Crisis: Causes, 
Consequences and Solutions. Willey Online Library. Available from: 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2443.2009.01103.x 
24 Ramskogler Paul. (2015). Tracing the origins of the financial crisis. OECD Journal: 
Financial Market Trends. Volume 2014/2:17. Available from: 
https://www.oecd.org/finance/Tracing-the-origins-of-the-financial-crisis.pdf 
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One of the ways these reserves could be invest is in firms’ equity. However, it was not 
easy for Asian countries, especially for China, to buy companies so they started 
investing in debt instruments. They bought large amounts of Treasuries, Fannie and 
Freddie mortgage-backed securities and other debt instruments. Consequently, the 
large supply of debt facilitated to drive down lending standards in order to guarantee 
that there was enough demand for debt from house buyers and other borrowers.25 
Hence, capital inflows from Asia caused an indirect influence on the US mortgage 
market. In the period before crisis, the USA have experienced the absorption of foreign 
capital which drove down the cost of credit, making loans cheap.26 
Consequently, the accessibility of credit in the US led to a housing construction boom 
and enabled debt-financed consumer spending.27 
1.4 Dot-Com Bust and Low Interest Rates 
After the collapse of the technology stock bubble, also known as dot-com bust, Federal 
Reserve and other central banks adopted the policy of low interest rates. In order to 
avoid a recession, the Federal Reserve cut interest rates to a level of one percent 
making interest rate much lower than in the previous 20 years when was followed the 
Taylor rule.28 
The USA was not the only country with low interest rates and house bubble. In many 
other countries interest rate was also low. It is argued that the housing booms were 
the largest in the countries which deviated the most from the Taylor rule and that 
within the Europe the deviations from the rule vary in size due to the inflation and 
output data which vary from country to country. For instance, the country which 
experienced the highest house bubble was Spain because of the largest deviation from 
the rule which dates back in 1992, while the country with the smallest bubble was 
Austria as it had the smallest changes in house investment as a share of GDP.29 
Consequently, deviation from the Taylor rule is correlated with increasement of asset 
prices and there are argues that this deviation was related to higher house demand. As 
the prices of houses rose, many people were motivated to borrow at one percent and 
buy houses going up at much higher rate. Namely, low interest rate policy drove down 
the cost of wholesale funding which was an important factor in increasement of credit 
 
25 Franklin Allen, Carletti Elena. (2010). An Overview of the Crisis: Causes, 
Consequences and Solutions. Willey Online Library. Available from: 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2443.2009.01103.x 
26 Ramskogler Paul. (2015) Tracing the origins of the financial crisis. OECD Journal: 
Financial Market Trends. Volume 2014/2:17. Available from: 
https://www.oecd.org/finance/Tracing-the-origins-of-the-financial-crisis.pdf 
27 Ramskogler Paul. (2015). Tracing the origins of the financial crisis. OECD Journal: 
Financial Market Trends. Volume 2014/2:17. Available from: 
https://www.oecd.org/finance/Tracing-the-origins-of-the-financial-crisis.pdf 
28Taylor B. John. (2008). The Financial Crisis and the Policy Responses: An Empirical 
Analysis of What Went Wrong. Available from: 
https://web.stanford.edu/~johntayl/FCPR.pdf 
29 Taylor B. John. (2008) The Financial Crisis and the Policy Responses: An Empirical 
Analysis of What Went Wrong. Available from: 
https://web.stanford.edu/~johntayl/FCPR.pdf 
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supply.30 However, the wholesale funding is prone to instability and being information 
sensitive during crisis it made the financial system more vulnerable as well. 
1.5 From Originate-to-Hold to Originate-to-Distribute Model 
In the past, banks traditionally would raise funds, screen borrowers and then lend 
money to the approved borrowers. In the case of borrower default the bank would 
have to bear losses. Therefore, it was a good encouragement for a bank to be careful 
and thoroughly examine potential borrowers. Also, mortgages were held by the banks 
so if there were some problems in that area such as unemployment or decrease of 
housing prices it would be concentrated in the banks which are in that area where the 
problems are occurring.  
However, things started to change in 1932 and 1938 when were founded the Federal 
Home Loan Banks (FHLBs) and the Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie 
Mae”).31 The aim was to add liquidity to the home mortgage market to facilitate home 
sales. Consequently, the home ownership rate increased from 43.6 percent in 1940 to 
61.9 percent in 1960.32 However, it seemed as not enough and further incentives were 
made. In 1970 was established the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 
(“Freddie Mac”) with an aim to make loans and loans guarantees and to create a 
market for mortgage-backed securities. What would happen is that the Freddie Mac 
would purchase mortgages and pool them and then sell MBSs to investors. This 
reduced the risk associated with the purchase of MBSs and motivated investors to hold 
them. The new method of mortgage finance was born. 
The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development had in mind the affordable 
housing and set an annual target for extending loans for low or moderate-income 
housing. After 1992, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were required to purchase 
affordable mortgages from banks, the mortgages that did not pass the usual 
creditworthiness requirement for loans. It created a demand and creation of market in 
subprime mortgages and mortgage-backed securities. Together with innovations came 
the competition and shortly after private sector also became involved in the MBS 
market. However, the difference is that the private sector subprime mortgages were 
not carrying the same implicit government guarantee which is provided to the loans 
issued by GSEs.33 
 
30Ramskogler Paul. (2015). Tracing the origins of the financial crisis. OECD Journal: 
Financial Market Trends. Volume 2014/2:17. Available from: 
https://www.oecd.org/finance/Tracing-the-origins-of-the-financial-crisis.pdf 
31Congleton D. Roger. (2010). The Political Economy of the Financial Crisis of 2008.  
In: Kolb W. Robert. Lessons from the Financial Crisis (Robert W. Kolb Series) 
[eBook]. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc, Chapter 4.  
32 Congleton D. Roger. (2010). The Political Economy of the Financial Crisis of 2008.  
In: Kolb W. Robert. Lessons from the Financial Crisis (Robert W. Kolb Series) 
[eBook]. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc, Chapter 4.  
33 Gilreath S. Zachary. (2018). The Culprit of the Great Recession: A detailed 
explanation of mortgage-backed securities, their impact on the 2008 Financial Crisis, 
and the legal aftermath. Journal of Business & Technology Law. Vol. 13(2):19. 
Available from: https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/jbtl/vol13/iss2/7/ 
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Hence, the pool of mortgages and MBS increased rapidly and became a significant 
element in investment portfolios. It allowed bubble in mortgage market to be built on 
a housing bubble. Investors wanted to hold these relatively safe assets instead of 
government securities. For instance, pension funds, hedge funds, insurance companies 
they all held MBS instead of government securities. In particular, bundling and insuring 
mortgages can be profitable when the house price is rising. Due to the risk-premium 
effect, they were more profitable to hold than prime mortgages because there is a 
reduction of a risk through insurance and diversification. 34 
As a consequence, the mortgage system had drastically changed. Instead of banks 
holding the mortgage as it was in a traditional “originate-to-hold model” now the bank 
would originate them and start selling them to be securitized. The process known as 
“originate-to-distribute model”. Also, the originators were paid based on the number 
of mortgages they approved so they were encouraged to approve as many mortgages 
possible.  
Consequently, the new originate-to distribute model deteriorated the quality of 
mortgages. The banks were not anymore motivated to use their screening and 
monitoring methods. This model allowed them to benefit from the origination fees 
without bearing the credit risk of borrowers. If the secondary market was functioning 
well, they were able to pass those loans to a third party.35 
 
 
 
34Congleton D. Roger. (2010). The Political Economy of the Financial Crisis of 2008.  
In: Kolb W. Robert. Lessons from the Financial Crisis (Robert W. Kolb Series) 
[eBook]. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc, Chapter 4 
35Purnanandam Amiyatosh. (2010). Originate-to-Distribute Model and the Subprime 
Mortgage Crisis. Available from: 
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2. Subprime Mortgages and Securitisation 
The rise of house prices together with financial innovations gave opportunity for riskier 
borrowers to become customers for mortgage lenders. Together with these 
innovations came innovations in process of securitisation which enabled vast number 
of subprime borrowers.  
2.1 The Rise of Subprime Mortgages 
After the Great Depression, the government wanted to enable a strong 
encouragement for lenders to give loans to low-income borrowers. However, through 
history many of the individuals which wanted to own a house did not meet the needed 
requirements. Many factors were the reason behind this, such as discrimination based 
on race, area or region or community-based redlining where a bank rejects someone 
due to the region or neighborhood where they live. Therefore, by the expansion of the 
subprime mortgages, individuals which before were not exceeding requirements were 
now able to fulfill their dream. Hence, besides prime mortgages, now there were also 
subprime mortgages which were given to the riskier borrowers. 
However, the question that arises is why innovations happened in housing market? 
Firstly, the housing market represents a particular importance due to its size and 
connection to the other markets. Secondly, in the environment of the saving glut, 
financers desired an investment that was as safe as Treasury Bonds but with a return 
that was not quite as trivial.36 Consequently, there were established a number of 
mortgage programs with an aim to alleviate some of the costs of the house buying, 
making mortgage loans available to the riskier borrowers. 
So, who were the subprime borrowers? The term subprime borrowers was used for 
borrowers “who do not qualify as for prime interest rates because they exhibit one or 
more of the following characteristics: weakened credit histories typically characterized 
by payment delinquencies, previous charge-offs, judgments or bankruptcies; low credit 
scores; high debt-burden ratios; or high loan-to-value ratios”.37 Moreover, they also 
can be identified by other characteristics, such as low interest rate at the beginning as 
a teaser rate that will later on, in couple of years or months, change to an adjustable 
rate. 
The Regulation represented one of the factors of the growth of the subprime 
mortgages. First of all, the Community Reinvestment Act did not cover most subprime 
mortgages. Moreover, due to the Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 1982, 
 
36Gans Kale. (2011). Anatomy of mortgage meltdown: The story of the subprime crisis, 
the role of fraud, and the efficacy of the Idaho Safe Act. Available 
from:https://www.uidaho.edu/-/media/UIdaho-Responsive/Files/law/law-
review/articles/volume-48/48-1-gans-
kale.pdf?la=en&hash=0E744C1E7D31089C85CE9F49CE1EC5435823A65B 
37Cole T. Roger, Director of the Federal Reserves’ Division of Banking Supervision and 
Regulation in testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban 
Affairs cited in: Brescia H. Raymond. (2008). Capital in chaos: the subprime mortgage 
crisis and the social capital response. Cleveland State Law Review. Vol. 56:271-318. 
Available from: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1124961 
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lenders were able to offer adjustable rate mortgages. In addition, the Tax Reform Act 
from 1986 definite that the interest paid on the residential mortgages remained the 
only consumer loans where the interest paid is tax deductible.38  
Furthermore, the growth of securitization of subprime mortgage products helped 
expansion of the subprime market through converting future income streams into 
immediate and liquid funds which were then used as a capital to fund more home 
finance. Consequently, the percentage of subprime loans comparing to other 
mortgages increased from 8% in 2003 to 20% in 2006. Also, much of it was funded by 
securitization: approximately 75% of the $600 billion of mortgages originated were 
securitized.39 
The demand for home loans affected the already loosen lending standards which just 
detreated even more, creating many murky types of loans. For instance, banks 
expanded their use to the “no-documentation loan” known also as NINJA loans which 
stands for “no income, no job, no assets” loans. That meant that a potential borrower 
did not need to state income or assets in order to qualify for a loan. Moreover, this 
situation created a “liar’s loans” which meant that borrowers started lying about their 
finance in order to get the house they could not actually afford. This was possible for 
them as no one bothered to verify their claims.40  
One of the problems in this chain was an information asymmetry. The relationship 
between the brokers and loan originators was exploiting the information asymmetry 
as the borrowers did not have the full understanding of the origination fees and 
mortgage insurance costs that would be assessed against them. They had an optimistic 
view of the housing market and did not have the full picture of the adjustable rate 
mortgages and mortgage options. In addition, problem was that many of those 
borrowers were relying on the refinancing for loan repayment. Hence, loans were 
given with a belief that due to the house appreciation, the mortgagor will be able to 
refinance to a lower rate mortgage. However, as the housing prices fell, the borrowers 
were not able to refinance. Instead, they defaulted.41 
2.2 Process of Securitisation 
Even though, there had been many factors which contributed to this financial crisis, 
the process of securitization is thought as the one of the greatest ones in the terms of 
 
38Brescia H. Raymond. (2008). Capital in chaos: the subprime mortgage crisis and the 
social capital response. Cleveland State Law Review. Vol. 56:271-318. Available from: 
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39Brescia H. Raymond. (2008). Capital in chaos: the subprime mortgage crisis and the 
social capital response. Cleveland State Law Review. Vol. 56:271-318. Available from: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1124961 
40Gans Kale. (2011). Anatomy of mortgage meltdown: The story of the subprime crisis, 
the role of fraud, and the efficacy of the Idaho Safe Act. Available 
from:https://www.uidaho.edu/-/media/UIdaho-Responsive/Files/law/law-
review/articles/volume-48/48-1-gans-
kale.pdf?la=en&hash=0E744C1E7D31089C85CE9F49CE1EC5435823A65B 
41Schwarcz L. Steven. (2010). Understanding the Subprime Financial Crisis. In: Kolb 
W. Robert. Lessons from the Financial Crisis (Robert W. Kolb Series) [eBook]. 
Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc, Chapter 10. 
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structural causes. It is widely argued that a securitization weakened the underwriting 
because the loan originators were not anymore motivated to collect information about 
likelihood of a borrower default. Moreover, this process encouraged participants to 
take riskier actions and rating agencies to overrate bundles.  
The securitization was not an invention of the 21st century. This process was already 
existed and was used in 1980s when the subprime lenders which were concentrated in 
Orange County, California, discovered that they could sell their subprime loans to Wall 
Street investors through selling the securities based on pools of those subprime loans. 
These lenders were known as “hard money” lenders which were requiring low loan-to-
value ratios. Consequently, when the Wall Street found out about these types of 
lenders, they became conventional.42  
Hence, when the Wall Street discovered the way to securitize subprime loans, the real 
boom of subprime started. Moreover, the investors also became interested when they 
found out that these AAA-rated securities backed by subprime mortgage provide them 
with a greater return comparing with other investments rated equally. The spiraling 
trend began.  
Therefore, how exactly was securitization working? In particular, the loans, which were 
before held by originator until they are repaid are now pooled and claims on their cash 
flows are sold to investors all around the world as bonds which are secured by 
mortgages. The bonds are known as residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) 
and asset-backed securities (ABS). 43 Hence, if the pool is consisted of the residential 
mortgages then they will be called residential mortgage-backed securities. When credit 
card debt or other types of consumer debt are pooled than it is called asset-backed 
securities (ABS). 
The mortgage banker originates the mortgage loan in the ordinary banking course. 
Then, when the enough block of mortgages is originated, the banker initiates process 
of securitization by selling or transferring the mortgagees to a special entity-Special 
Purpose vehicle (SPV). This Vehicle can be a trust, a corporation or a partnership which 
is set up by a mortgage broker or an investment bank with an aim to purchase this 
mortgages and act as a channel for the mortgage payment flows. By moving the 
mortgages to the SPV, banks were moving the risk exposure from their balance sheet. 
Importantly, with a less risk on the balance sheet, the originator is subject to a lower 
capital requirement. 
At the beginning, the MBS were only carrying the prepayment risk, the risk of early, 
unscheduled return of principal on a fixed-income security. Due to their long 
maturities, the mortgages are prone to this kind of a risk. Hence, if interest rates 
decline and borrower pays off his loan before maturity, the investor would not receive 
the anticipated stream of income at the agreed upon interest rate and will suffer 
significant losses. In order to overcome this, the collateralized mortgage obligations, 
generally known as collateralized debt obligations (CDO) were created. They allocated 
the cash flows of the MBS into the tranches so that the investor who preferred a short-
 
42Eggert Kurt. (2009). The great collapse: How securitization caused the subprime 
meltdown. Available from: https://works.bepress.com/kurt_eggert/7/ 
43Kathleen C. Engel and Patricia A. McCoy. (2007). Turning a blind eye: Wall Street 
finance of predatory lending. Fordham Law Review. Vol. 75(4):68. Available from: 
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4248&context=flr 
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term security could buy an early tranche while the one who is willing to take more risk 
will prefer the later pay tranches.44 
Typically, these securities are divided in tranches which order depends on terms of 
priority of payment. Therefore, the claims of the most senior tranche of securities are 
paid in full before the next tranche receives any payments. This system reminds of a 
waterfall as cash is spilling down into an empty bucket. 45 Hence, when the most senior 
tranche is payed completely and that bucket is full then the excess cash spills to the 
next most senior tranche and so on until either there are no more cash flows, or the 
bucket of the most junior tranche is filled. There are three basic levels of tranches. The 
senior tranche is at the top and it’s the safest one as it first gets the payment in the 
waterfall, but it offered the lowest interest rate. In the middle by safeness and return 
was a mezzanine tranche. At the bottom was the equity tranche as it is the first 
tranche to get hit by losses, however if everything goes well, it will get the highest 
returns.46  
The important role here has the Rating Agency. The Rating Agency is supposed to rate 
these resulting securities. The securitization is set up in order that the majority of 
resulting securities would be rated AAA. Consequently, in usual securitization process 
approximately 80% of residential mortgage-backed securities would be rated AAA, 10% 
AA, 5% A and 5% BBB+ or lower.47  
Moreover, in order to get higher rating score securities will get some type of credit 
enhancement. This credit enhancement can come from the asset itself or from some 
external source. For instance, from an asset itself it can include subordination of 
different tranches to higher rated tranches and overcollateralizing the asset pool. As 
for external source, the SPV can buy a surety bond or a letter of credit from a financial 
institution.48 In addition, one important source of credit enhancement is the credit 
default swaps which are issued by the insurance companies. Therefore, if the issuer 
failed to make a principal or interest payments, the insurance company would. 
Thus, what were incentives of banks for selling these pools to investors? One of the 
main reasons is that they receive an immediate funds for originating the new loans. 
Secondly, they move a risk to investors, Thirdly, CDOs give banks a new and more 
products to sell as a new financial innovation which gives them a comparative 
advantage. 
 
44Zachary S. Gilreath. (2018). The Culprit of the Great Recession: A detailed 
explanation of mortgage-backed securities, their impact on the 2008 Financial Crisis, 
and the legal aftermath. Journal of Business & Technology Law. Vol. 13(2):19. 
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45Kolb W. Robert. (2010). Incentives in the Originate-to-Distribute Model of Mortgage 
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One of the problems in this process is a compensation. In the process of securitization 
payment was based on the quantity of the sold loans rather than on a quality and 
many actors were motivated to give higher ratings and originate as much loans as 
possible. The originator was not anymore motivated to monitor credit-granting 
process. This represents a principal-agent problem which occurs when the motivations 
of the originator are not aligned with those of the entity that holds loans.49Therefore, 
in order to get higher compensation they are motivated to buy as much loans they can, 
even if they are of a bad quality. This can lead to casual and indifferent investigation of 
the quality of mortgages that a company is buying.50 
Consequently, the securitization lowered the standard of loans, weakened the 
underwriting and create an information asymmetry. In particular, through these 
processes’ securities were far removed from the initial subprime mortgages, making it 
impossible for investor to track the CDO securities to the subprime mortgages that 
initially created their value. What was left for them is to rely on the rating grade and 
Rating Agencies. 
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3. Risk Management and Mismanagement 
After the crisis, the question which was continuously asked is weather the bust could 
be predicted. Key points, which are argued to be major weaknesses in risk assessment 
are the misleading ratings from rating agencies, the simple risk models which were not 
design for a complexity of a structured finance, inaccurate data and short-term 
financing with a little consideration for liquidity risk.51 
3.1 The Role of Rating Agencies 
Rating agencies play one of the crucial roles in the financial markets. Investors depend 
on them and expect them to be independent and objective. Hence, the rating agencies 
act as gatekeepers and investors and regulators are relying on them to provide 
objective, timely and accurate financial information.52 However, the rating agencies’ 
practice during the financial crisis deteriorated this trust bond.  
The Rating Agencies played an important role in the process of securitization. Namely, 
after the securities are being pooled together and trenched it is necessary to rate each 
tranche and that is when the rating agencies step in. Their aim is to rate these 
securities by whether they will meet the payment and performance obligations.53 This 
process was argued to be objective and meticulous. 
Therefore, the logical question that comes up is why agencies failed to assess the risk 
properly. One of the main reasons is that the issuer was paying the rating. This 
situation created a conflict of interest between obtaining issuer business and objective 
rating. Moreover, it was argued that it was difficult to even gain access to the 
necessary loan information in order to calculate the rating. Managers were pressuring 
for a credit estimate but without giving any loan documentation.54  
Furthermore, the regulators also failed to impose penalties for incorrect ratings and 
did not have adequate oversight of their business. The CRA became so dominant that it 
was too difficult to penalize them in that moment. For instance, the Big Three agencies 
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(Moody’s, S&P and Fitch) dominated the USA market and rated 98 percent of the 
asset-backed securities which were issued in the States.55 
Moreover, it was not unusual for a securitizer to hire a rating agency first as a 
consultant in order to give them directions on how to create securities that will be high 
rated and then the same agency to rate them.56 
On the other side, the investors relied on those ratings. It is argued that the reason 
behind this is that the high ratings are attractive for investors because when the 
bubble burst that good rating will provide corporate officers an excuse for a bad 
decisions and poorly executed risk management procedures.57 
3.2 Failures of Risk Managment 
There are argues that the policy makers were already in 2006 trying to warn about the 
weaknesses in the financial system. However, it seems like no one was listening. They 
were too busy pooling assets, structuring CDOs and selling them to investors in the 
environment of low interest rates and volatility. It appears that the risk measurement 
models failed and underestimated risk. 
Firstly, the investors relied completely on the rating made by rating agency. Investors 
decided to invest in these complex structures because they were promising a higher 
yield than traditional assets such Treasury and corporate bonds with the same rating 
grade. However, investors had less information about the quality of this assets than 
the originator. The problem was that the rated CDOs were CDO-squareds as the 
underlying pools of assets in this CDOs were not constituted from the individual 
mortgages but instead it was composed from the subprime mortgage backed securities 
that were tranches of individual subprime mortgages.58  Moreover, rating agencies use 
the Monte Carlo-type stimulations to stimulate cash flows and correlated defaults of 
the assets and allocate the cash flows to the various tranches according to the 
waterfall which produces an expected loss for each trance.59 The problem is that it 
cannot be used the same rating scale for bonds and for structured products. The 
corporate bonds are mainly exposed to the idiosyncratic risks which are risks specific 
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to the firm, the quality of their management and position of the company in the 
industry. On the other hand, the tranches of the CDOs carry systematic risk which is 
not a factor for individual company’s risk.  
In the originate to distribute model, banks were moving away from their balance sheet 
the assets to the structured investment vehicle (SIV). Their purpose was to fund the 
purchase of the, primarily long-term assets with the short-term asset-backed 
commercial paper and some medium-term notes and capital. In this environment, the 
liquidity risk arises because there is a need to refinance due to the maturity mismatch 
between assets and liabilities. 60 
Moreover, the financial firms alone were taking excessive risk. The bonus culture 
among the bankers created an incentive that the higher risk you take, the greater 
profitability will be and with that comes the higher compensation. However, excessive 
risk has systematic consequences and goes beyond personal wealth and one sector. 
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4. The beginning of an end 
The crisis started from the innovations related with a real state sector. The reason why 
was this sector so important is firstly the size of this sector and its connections with 
other sectors. Secondly, the health of this sector represents an indicator of the health 
of economy at large and is constituted as one of the bedrocks of the social and 
economic system. From a sociological aspect, it is believed that home ownership 
promotes community-based values, nurture respect for law and order and it flourish 
the stability of the system. From the economical point of view, the steady appreciation 
of home values can provide the basis for an increasement in consumption which is the 
driving force in the economy of the USA.61 
The crisis was triggered in mid of 2007 by deflation of the US housing boom. The 
housing prices started to fall for the first time in more than a decade. This was the first 
significant decline of the housing prices in the postwar period and was much faster 
than in previous recessions. According to the Case-Shiller index, the housing prices had 
reached their peak in 2006 and then dropped by approximately 18 percent in the next 
two years.62 
Due to its economic and social factor, the burst of the housing bubble influenced the 
private consumption, increased unemployment and mortgage defaults. Because the 
asset value of a house was less than the value of the mortgage, the delinquencies rate 
grew. Furthermore, the issuers of the mortgages did not have enough reserves so risk 
of default of insurers rose. The value of the credit-backed security fell as the potential 
buyers were asking for higher risk premiums. Moreover, this could not be solved by 
borrowing, as the stock prices of insurers fell how their losses accumulated, and they 
could not raise new money by selling stock or borrowing supported by the value of the 
equity capital.63 
In the summer of 2007, it was clear the full scale of financial fallout. The first moment 
which shaken the market confidence was when the BNP Paribas, the France’s most 
prominent bank, announced that its freezing three of their funds. The explanation was 
that “the complete evaporation of liquidity in certain market segments of the U.S. 
securitization market had made it impossible to value certain assets fairly regardless of 
their quality or credit rating”.64 This meant that as there was not a valuation, the assets 
could not be used as collateral and without a collateral there is no a funding. Hence, 
 
61Bardhan Ashok. (2010). Of Subprimes and Sundry Symptoms: The Political Economy 
of the Financial Crisis. In: Kolb W. Robert. Lessons from the Financial Crisis (Robert 
W. Kolb Series) [eBook]. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc, Chapter 3 
62Congleton D. Roger. (2010). The Political Economy of the Financial Crisis of 2008. 
In: Kolb W. Robert. Lessons from the Financial Crisis (Robert W. Kolb Series) 
[eBook]. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc, Chapter 4 
63Congleton D. Roger. (2010). The Political Economy of the Financial Crisis of 2008. 
In: Kolb W. Robert. Lessons from the Financial Crisis (Robert W. Kolb Series) 
[eBook]. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc, Chapter 4 
64BNP Paribas Suspends Funds because of Subprime Problems”, New York Times, 
August 9, 200, cited in: Tooze Adam. (2018). Crashed. [eBook]. First published in the 
United States of America by Viking, an imprint of Penguin Random House LLC 2018, 
First published in Great Britain by Allen Lane: Penguin Books Ltd, Chapter: 6 
24 
 
stress on the inter banking lending increased and all the banks were in problem 
regardless of their exposure to the real estate sector. Consequently, in September one 
of the largest Britain’s mortgage lenders, Northern Rock failed. The Northern Rock did 
not have a high exposure to the subprime mortgages in the USA so the reason why it 
failed were not loans on its balance sheet, it was the way of its funding, depending on 
the wholesale funding. The problem was that it sourced its funding from the markets 
heavily used by banks that did.65 
Shortly after, the panic spread from the individual banks to the whole system. During a 
spring and summer of 2008, the haircuts on bilateral repo took a severe step up across 
the board, for all asset classes and for all parties.66 The real consequences started to 
appear. The real business activity was stumbling on the both sides of the Atlantic and 
soon it was spread to the households and nonfinancial corporations. Firstly, the 
decline of the house prices reduced personal wealth. Moreover, as demand fell, so did 
employment and production. For instance, Germany suffered a 34 percent fall in 
exports between the second quarter of 2008 and 2009, which was the strongest 
economic shock since its foundation in 1949. Moreover, the oil prices fell by more than 
76 percent which caused destruction with the budgets of the petrostates such as Saudi 
Arabia, Dubai and Kuwait. It is estimated that around 27 million to 40 million of people 
had lost their jobs. 67 
What made this crisis so severe was the interconnection on the global level. The World 
Trade organization collected the data of 104 countries and every single of them 
experienced a decline in imports and exports.68  
4.1 Shock and Initial Reactions 
Every country in which the crisis occurred had to take some combination of 
mechanisms. There were four mechanisms for the intervention: 1. Loans to banks 2. 
Recapitalization 3. Asset purchase 4. State guarantees for banks deposits, bank debts 
or balance sheet.69 
Not all the countries answered the same on the crisis, nor did they have the same 
resources. For instance, in the Ireland and Iceland, the crisis took over the whole 
country. On the other hand, some countries, such as Switzerland handled the situation 
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better and survived intact. Also, banks in Australia, Canada and Sweden fared better 
and did not need a government support. Some other countries, such as Germany, 
France, UK tried to handle the crisis with the organizational and financial solutions, 
proposing common European response to the crisis.  
When it comes to the USA, it had the most capacities to stop the financial crisis. 
Importantly, in September of 2007, the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were placed 
under conservatorships and were nationalized. This was supposed to be a message to 
the bondholders that the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will not fail. 70  
The cumulation came on, the now famous weekend, the 13 and 14 of September. The 
Lehman Brothers were looking to find a buyer. One of the last solutions was that the 
Bank of America buys the Lehman, however it bought Merrill Lynch instead. Finally, 
last hope was the British bank, Barclays. However, the purchase was stopped from the 
very top. The reason why was that the London did not want to “import the America’s 
cancer”.71 The argument made to justify the fall of Lehman Brothers was that the 
ending of uncertainty could calm the markets. However, it happened totally opposite.  
The investors all over the world were worried about the risk and it became difficult for 
banks to raise capital through deposits and shares. The US government was forced to 
decide. The Treasury stepped in with the $700 billion bailout while the Federal Reserve 
bought $1.75 trillion in MBS directly.72 The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act 
proposed by Henry Paulson was passed in 2008 and it created the Troubled Asset 
Relief Program (TARP) to purchase bad assets from financial institutions.  
While the USA concentrated toward the recapitalization, the Europe was struggling to 
have a common approach toward the situation. There was a lot of denial and 
assumptions that the crisis is far away in the USA and that it is not a threat for the 
Europe.73There was an argument that the Europe could get with only national 
solutions. However, crisis had a sever aftermath in the Europe. Together with a 
liquidity freeze came the burst of housing bubbles. The governments of these 
countries needed to provide support to the banks which were offering these services. 
In addition, fiscal stimulus programs were brought to support the real sector. 
However, in three countries, Greece, Ireland and Portugal fiscal impact was 
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overwhelming and the European sovereign debt crisis erupted which put monetary 
integration into crisis.74 
Therefore, it was not a surprise that the initial reaction to the crisis was shock, denial 
and inconsistency. In some countries, such as England, the Bank of England until the 
collapse of the Northern Rock was knocking on the door, was refusing to provide the 
liquidity to the struggling banks, stating that it can provoke the question of moral 
hazard.75  
As it can be seen, governments in both advanced and developing countries were trying 
to avoid catastrophic depression through different mechanisms. However, not all 
countries felt the effects of the US recession by the end of 2008. In particular, China 
has managed to keep their economy growing in 2009 which was supported by stimulus 
package of authorities. Also, India was also able to resist thanks to strong domestic 
demand.76 
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5. Post-Crisis Regulation 
The post-crisis reform response has had three aims. Firstly, to reduce the probability of 
failing of any larger financial institution. Secondly, to limit the harmful spillovers to the 
broader economy and thirdly, to reduce the risk that taxpayers would absorb loses in a 
potential future crisis.77 In order to prevent the fall of large institutions, the capital and 
liquidity requirements are increased while in order to prevent a spillovers, the new 
tools were created with an aim to manage the institutional failure.  
Before crisis, banks did not have enough loss-absorbing common equity. Heightened 
capital regulation represents the single most important regulatory reform. In 
particular, it is argued that it is crucial for the banks to have enough of cushion of 
equity capital. Firstly, with a cushion, banks will be the ones who will absorb the losses 
in crisis instead of taxpayers. Secondly, it can also help to reduce distortions connected 
with the too-big-to fail problem. Thirdly, with the heightened capital requirements 
banks will be able to survive with large losses without failing which can bring the 
broader economy into crisis.78  
Economists argue that reforms put a light burden on the banks since they are shifting 
their funding from debt capital to the equity capital. What is important is that the risk 
is shifted from the debtholders to the shareholders and leaves the total amount of 
bank risk unchanged.79  
5.1 The USA response- the Dodd-Frank Act 
As a response to the crisis, in the USA in 2010 was brought the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act). The Title I of the Act created 
the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) which granted it the authority to 
designate systematically important non-bank financial companies and is aimed toward 
enhanced prudential regulatory regime for certain large bank holding companies and 
the non-financial companies. The Title II created the Orderly Liquidation Authority 
 
77 Greenwood Robin, Hanson G. Samuel, Stein Jeremey, Sunderam Adi. (2017). The 
financial regulatory reform agenda. Project on Behavioral Finance and Financial 
Stability: Harvard Business School. Available from: https://www.hbs.edu/behavioral-
finance-and-financial-stability/Documents/2017-
09%20The%20Financial%20Regulatory%20Reform%20Agenda%20in%202017.pdf 
78 Greenwood Robin, Hanson G. Samuel, Stein Jeremey, Sunderam Adi. (2017). The 
financial regulatory reform agenda. Project on Behavioral Finance and Financial 
Stability: Harvard Business School. Available from: https://www.hbs.edu/behavioral-
finance-and-financial-stability/Documents/2017-
09%20The%20Financial%20Regulatory%20Reform%20Agenda%20in%202017.pdf 
79 Greenwood Robin, Hanson G. Samuel, Stein Jeremey, Sunderam Adi. (2017). The 
financial regulatory reform agenda. Project on Behavioral Finance and Financial 
Stability: Harvard Business School. Available from: https://www.hbs.edu/behavioral-
finance-and-financial-stability/Documents/2017-
09%20The%20Financial%20Regulatory%20Reform%20Agenda%20in%202017.pdf 
28 
 
(OLA) for resolution regime available outside of the Bankruptcy Code for systematically 
important financial institutions.80  
Also, the largest banks, which failure can impose a problem for the broaden economy, 
are required to have a higher capital standard than smaller banks due to the Global 
Systematically Important Bank surcharge.  
There were a lot of failures when it comes to assessing the risk, estimating the grade of 
the loans and overall the failure of the risk management. These failures motivated the 
stress-testing and the capital planning in the largest banks. Hence, Federal Reserve’s 
annual Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) exercise is designed with an 
aim to assess whether the largest banks in the USA would have enough of capital to 
continue lending to households and companies in the situation of economic downturn.  
Moreover, it also assesses whether banks have robust forward-looking plans for 
rebuilding capital if there were significant losses. These annual stress tests represent 
one of the most useful regulatory reforms after the crisis which helps the risk-based 
capital framework to be more dynamic and forward-looking.81 Moreover, many 
executives of the banks have acknowledged that the annual Fed stress testing have 
made their firms better at managing the risk.82  
Before crisis, the shadow banking, where the financial activities were happening 
outside of traditional regulated banks, was growing. “Regulatory migration” is a term 
which describes the tendency of the financial institution to flow to the areas where the 
financial regulation is the lightest. Under the Dodd-Frank act, the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council (FSOC) is responsible for monitoring systematic risk and migration 
across jurisdictions. Also, the FSOC played a crucial role when it comes to money 
market mutual funds. Namely, before the crisis, the mutual funds were offering a 
saving product, which was similar to the bank checking deposit, meaning that it was 
promised that if you invest one dollar in a mutual funds, you could always withdraw 
the same amount almost immediately. The problem was that they were not as secure 
as the checking deposits and were not subject to the liquidity and capital regulations 
as banks were. Therefore, the FSOC pushed the SEC to reform the regulation for the 
mutual funds. Hence, now the institutional shares of mutual funds cannot promise the 
fixed one dollar to the investors.83  
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In addition, prior to the crisis, there were not the proper tools for the resolution of the 
financial institutions. Especially a problem was with bigger institutions, as it was 
proven in the case of the Lehman Brothers, which failure influenced the broader 
economy. After the crisis, three new policies were brought, especially for large 
financial institutions: The Orderly Liquidation Authority created under the Title II of the 
Dodd-Frank act, the FDIC’s Single point of Entry resolution strategy and the Federal 
Reserve’s Total loss absorbing capacity. The aim is to ensure that the stockholder and 
long-term debtors will bear the losses and not the taxpayers and to solve the too big to 
fail problem. Moreover, it will help the firms to fail in the orderly way that maintains 
normal operations while the firms go through the reorganization and prevent the 
spillovers to the wider economy.84  
 
5.2 The EU institutional reforms-De Larosière Report and creation of Banking Union 
 
The macroprudential tools such as capital and liquidity requirements were brought in 
order to improve resilience of the banks and to prevent spillovers. Furthermore, two 
other above-mentioned aims were achieved through the macroprudential regulation 
and bank crisis management policies, with instruments such as anticyclical capital 
requirements, higher capital standards for global systematic institutions and bank 
recovery and resolution policies.85  
The initial reaction on the European Union level was in the October 2008, when the 
European Commission introduced proposals for amendments to the CRD which was 
brought in 2006, known as CRD II. Through this, it was applied more onerous capital 
requirements to asset securitisation. Moreover, it was introduced the “supervisory 
colleges” for voluntary coordination of oversight and proposal for a limited 
harmonized deposit scheme after the Irish situation.86 Furthermore, the proposals 
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were continued for credit rating agencies, hedge funds and private equity investors. 
Also, there were new amendments to the CRD, now known as CRD IV.87 
De Larosière Report was tailored in 2009 against a challenging backdrop of crisis and 
recession with three essential steps against any future collapse: a new regulatory 
agenda, stronger coordinated supervision and effective crisis management procedures. 
Firstly, it was created a European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) with a 
purpose to ensure the supervision of the Union’s financial system. It is consisted of 
three European Supervisory Authorities: European Banking Authority, the European 
Securities and Market Authority and European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Authority. In these authorities are participating national supervisors who will be able 
to issue Regulatory and Implementing Technical Standards and non-binding guidelines 
and recommendations. Moreover, the European Systematic Board was proposed as a 
Board which will monitor macro-prudential issues and make recommendations which 
will be hosted by the ECB.  
As the crisis evolved into Eurozone debt crisis, it was necessary for further reforms in 
order to break a cycle between banks and national finance. Consequently, in June 
2012, it was agreed to create a Banking Union, completing the monetary and economic 
union and allowing the centralized application of EU rules for banks in the Euro area as 
well as for non-Euro Member States that would like to join. The new regulatory 
framework with common rules is set out in the “single rulebook” and is foundation of 
Banking Union. In particular, the most important are the capital requirements set in 
the Capital Requirements Directive (“CRD IV”) and the Capital Requirements 
Regulation (“CRR”). Moreover, if a bank suffers financial difficulties, common rules had 
been set up to recover or resolve a bank. This framework can be found in the Directive 
on Bank Recovery and Resolution (“BRRD”). Also, common rules will ensure that all EU 
retail customers are guaranteed that their deposits up to 100,000 euros per depositor 
are protected at all times in the EU.88 
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6. Basel III  
In 2010, the Basel Committee published proposals for the new Basel, known as Basel 
III. The aim was to higher capital requirements, introducing a new additional capital 
requirement known as the capital conversation buffer and countercyclical capital 
requirement, the introduction of the liquidity coverage ratio and net stable ratio, 
leverage requirement and counterparty risk capital requirements. The reasons behind 
these new proposals can be found in the actions taken during and before crisis. In 
particular, during a crisis, not all countries answered the same to the situation. Some 
countries were able to inject high capital while some countries were not able to offer 
that kind of a support. Therefore, with a higher capital requirement, all banks would be 
on the same level of the playing field and some banks will not be punished in that 
respect comparing with others.89 
To begin with, there are two main capital components: Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital. The 
Tier 1 capital is “going concern capital” as it absorbs losses without a need for a bank 
liquidation. The Tier 1 is composed of the common equity Tier 1 which includes the 
instruments such as common shares, stock surplus and retained earnings that do not 
have a maturity date, do not require any reimbursement and do not have an obligation 
to distribute dividends. Also, in Tier 1 is the additional Tier 1 which is different than 
common equity one as on the condition of approval of the supervisor, it may be 
callable by the issuers, even if only after the minimum five years. Tier 2 is “gone 
concern capital” that means that it can absorb losses if the bank goes to liquidation 
and stops to operate. It includes only one type of the instruments-the issued and paid-
in debt instruments which must be subordinated to depositors and general creditors of 
the banks, have a minimum of five years of maturity, have no credit sensitive dividend 
feature and can also be callable as the additional tier 1. Together the Tier 1 and Tier 2 
must be equal to the at least 8 % of the bank’s risk weighted assets and they represent 
a total capital. These two Tiers are designed as to absorb losses before any public 
intervention.90  
From the 1st of January 2013, the new Tiers issued after that day, have to have a 
provision where they are written off or converted into common equity upon the 
situation of a trigger event. The reason behind this is to protect the taxpayers and 
focus contribution of the banking industry itself in resolving crisis, hence the capital 
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securities holders will also bear the costs of the bank’s restructuring as their securities 
will be converted into plain equity and offset by losses.91 
Also, in Basel III were introduced two new tools to solve the problem of procyclicality. 
The first one is the capital conversation buffer that is a 2,5% common equity capital 
cushion and together with the original 4,5 % represents a 7% of minimum requirement 
for the common equity. If a bank does not have the minimum capital requirements it 
will be limited in the distribution of earnings. Hence, the higher gap is, the more 
onerous limits are. The advantage of this buffer is that during bad times, this capital 
cushion will bear the losses without the need for a bank to stop with their activities. It 
is automatic, and it does not depend on the supervisors’ discretion and does not leave 
any uncertainty to the market.92  
The second tool is countercyclical capital buffer. It is consisted of the additional capital 
requirements which is raising when the credit supply is above the trend and falls 
during phases of credit reductions. Therefore, “credit institutions and investment firms 
should calculate their institution-specific buffers as weighted average of the 
countercyclical buffer rates that apply in the country where their credit exposures are 
located. Every Member State should therefore designate an authority responsible for 
the quarterly setting of the countercyclical buffer rate for exposures detected in that 
Member States. That buffer rate should take into account the growth of credit levels 
and changes to the ratio of credit to GDP in that Member State and any other variables 
relevant to the risk to stability of financial system”.93 It is imposed on the discretionary 
basis by the national supervisors in the case of excessive credit growth. The aim is to 
protect the banking system from excessive credit growth which can have an impact to 
the systematic risk. 
Also, it specified the minimum leverage ratio which aims to constrain excess leverage 
in banking system. It is important as it complements the risk-weighted capital 
requirements by providing a safety guard against unsustainable levels of leverage.94  
The Basel III also addressed the interconnection of financial institutions and systematic 
risk. Namely, there were brought new tools as higher capital requirements for inter-
financial sector exposures and specific requirements for global systematically 
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important banks. There were introduced more onerous requirements for the global 
systematically important banks (G-SIBs). Those are the banks which can cause a 
systematic risk in the financial system and are perceived to be too big to fail. In order 
to assess which bank is a global systematic bank, the Basel Committee had developed 
a certain methodology. The factors are whether a bank has a cross-jurisdictional 
activity, the size, interconnectedness with other institutions, the substitutability and 
offer of infrastructure services and its complexity measured by the volume of trading, 
the amount of illiquid and complex assets and the volume of trading in over the 
counter derivatives. Banks are then allocated in the five buckets, depending on their 
final score. The additional capital requirement that is in the form of common equity 
Tier 1 capital ranging from 1% to 3,5%.95  
Further important changes are for liquidity regulation. Before the crisis, banks would 
finance long-term, illiquid assets with the short-term debt deposits, creating the 
maturity transformation. When these short-term creditors withdrew their funding, the 
excessive maturity transformation created a risk of “bank run” scenarios. In the 
situation where the creditors are withdrawing their funding, it can be difficult for a 
bank as it needs to sell its illiquid assets prematurely at the first-sale price. Hence, the 
Basel III regulated the “liquidity requirements” which are limiting the maturity 
transformation. The new requirements are the Net Stable Funding Ratio which is 
designed to address liquidity mismatches, covering the whole balance sheet and 
motivating banks to use stable sources of funding. Second one is the Liquidity 
Coverage Ratio which requires banks to have sufficient high-liquidity assets to 
withstand a 30-day stressed funding scenarios.96  
Also, it introduced the increasement in capital requirements for the counterparty risk 
exposures in over the counter derivatives. Banks are now required to apply new 
standardized approach for measuring the exposure and higher capital for inter-
financial sector exposures.97  
Moreover, Pillar 2 aims at strengthening some of the points which were battered 
during crisis such as the enhanced risk-management of off-balance sheet exposures 
and securitisation activities, compensation practices, valuation practices, stress testing, 
accounting standards and corporate governance. For securitisation, it reduced the 
reliance on the external ratings, increased requirements for riskier exposures and 
limited the number of approaches for calculating capital charges. 98 
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6.1 The Basel IV 
In 2017, the Basel Committee introduced several revisions to the existing Basel Accord, 
known as Basel IV. The new revision will become effective in January of 2022. The key 
element is revised standardized approach for credit risk which aims to enhance 
robustness and sensitivity of this approach.99 Moreover, it constrains the use of 
internal model approach. Hence, the advanced internally model approaches have been 
removed for exposures of large and mid-sized financial institutions and the use of the 
IRB approach will be limited to low-default portfolios. Furthermore, its revised capital 
charge for credit value adjustment for derivatives exposures by removing the 
possibility for banks to use internal models for estimating CVA. Also, it altered 
approach for operational risk which will be determent based on a measure of bank’s 
income and a measure of a bank’s historical losses. In addition, it introduced additional 
leverage requirement for the global systematically important banks which will take the 
form of a Tier 1 capital buffer set at 50% of a G-SIB’s risk-weighted capital buffer. 
Finally, it will replace the existing output floor from Basel II with a more risk sensitive 
floor which will ensure that the bank’s risk weighted assets which are generated by the 
internal models do not fall below a predefined minimum of the value of RWA (72,5%). 
It will become effective from 2022 and until 2027 it will gradually increase. By this, it 
will stop the capital benefits that a bank may have using internal models. However, it 
will not be effective for the USA banks as they are already subject to the 100% floor 
under the Dodd-Frank Act. 100 
 
6.2 The Recovery and Resolution Tools 
One of the aims of the post-crisis banking resolution is to prevent the spillovers on the 
other financial institutions in case of a crisis and to prevent the need for taxpayers to 
bear the losses. Therefore, the new tools were introduced where not only are equity 
holders bearing the loss but also bank’s creditors. Hence, it has been shifted from the 
bail-out to the bail-in framework.  
These new tools are the part of the more general bank recovery and resolution 
framework which were introduced both at the international level by the Financial 
Stability Board and The Basel Committee and at the European level by European 
Commission. 
One of the tools which were introduced is the requirement for the banks to hold a 
minimum amount of the loss absorbing liabilities which can be written down or 
converted into equity in case of bank solvency crisis. Hence, the Financial Stability 
Board have brought the requirement for the global systematically important banks 
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which should increase the loss absorbing capacity in scenario of solvency crisis. This 
requirement is introduced in the form of Total Loss Absorbing Capacity (TLAC). 101 Also, 
the Basel Committee has developed the methodology for identifying G-SIBS according 
to their impact of bank’s failure on the financial system.102 The aim is that if G-SIBs fail, 
have enough capacity to ensure an orderly resolution without an effect to the financial 
stability or taxpayers. The TLAC will be implemented in two phases. The first one is a 
three-year transitional period which started in January 2019 and will end in December 
2021. The second phase will start in January 2022. TLAC must be consisted of the 
instruments which can be written off or converted into equity and those are capital 
instruments (CET1, AT1 and T2) and subordinated and senior debt. Some instruments, 
such as deposits, covered bonds, derivatives are excluded.  
Moreover, external TLAC requirements apply to resolution entities which can be bank 
holding or operating companies while internal TLAC applies to material sub-groups or 
individual subsidiaries within the group which will help the losses to flow to the 
resolution entities.  
In addition, through the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) in Europe was 
brought the additional loss absorbing capacity requirement in the form of minimum 
requirement of own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL). Hence, banks are required to 
maintain the sufficient amount of financial resources capable to absorb losses and 
recapitalize the institution. Differently then TLAC, it is set individually for each bank 
and is applied to all banks in the EU while the TLAC is applied for G-SIBs. The MREL 
requirement is composed of: 1. a loss absorption amount which should be equal to the 
total capital requirement (Pillar 1 and 2) and its capital buffers 2. a recapitalization 
amount which is equal to the bank’s total capital requirement and the 3. a market 
confidence charge which is based on a discretionary basis by the national resolution 
authority.103 
One important point related to TLAC and MREL is the issuing entity. In the single point 
of entry, resolution powers are applied to one resolution entity while in the multiple 
point of entry there are more than one resolution entity. 
To conclude, the new tools are important as they will affect market discipline. 
Undoubtedly, the bail outs which occurred during crisis had deteriorated the market 
discipline and now shifting to the bail in mechanisms will constrain banks of taking high 
risks.  
 
101Sironi Andrea. (2018). The evolution of banking regulation since the crisis: a critical 
assessment, Working paper N.103. University Bocconi: Baffi Carefin, Center for 
Applied Research on International Markets, Banking, Finance, and Regulation. 
Available from: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3304672&download=yes 
102Financial Stability Institute. (2017). Bank resolution framework-Executive summary. 
Bank for International Settlements. Available from: 
https://www.bis.org/fsi/fsisummaries/brf.pdf 
103 Sironi Andrea. (2018). The evolution of banking regulation since the crisis: a critical 
assessment, Working paper N.103. University Bocconi: Baffi Carefin, Center for 
Applied Research on International Markets, Banking, Finance, and Regulation. 
Available from: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3304672&download=yes 
36 
 
6.3 Critical Assessment 
After it was brought, the Basel III was subject to several critics. Overall, many were 
disappointed as some of the planned reforms were less onerous in the final version. 
Firstly, it is argued that the new Accord did not superseded the previous one and 
instead it introduced changes alongside. Namely, the Basel III does not change the risk 
weighting, as it does not require banks to hold more capital against specific exposures. 
In addition, the countercyclical capital buffer also appears as controversial tool. Firstly, 
it is argued that it is not fair that this tool does not only affect the banks which are 
more aggressively increasing their lending but also all the banks which are lending to 
borrowers located in a particular country in the same way. Hence, even the more 
prudent and conservative banks will be punished by this requirement and will suffer 
due to behavior of more aggressive banks.104 Secondly, this buffer is based on 
borrower’s nationality and not on the banks which is in contrast with the need to 
control the financial leverage during economic growth. Hence, it should be controlled 
on the level of the banking group as there is where the leverage increases or 
decreases. Therefore, this can provoke many incentives for multinationals groups 
which could easily avoid it by raising funds through their subsidiaries which are located 
in countries where buffer does not apply and then to channel those funds to operating 
companies which are located in countries where the buffer applies.105 
Furthermore, even though Basel III did improve some aspects of capital management it 
did not solve the main problems of risk weighting approach in capital requirement 
calculation. Moreover, it was criticized that risk modeling only focusses on a single 
global risk factor(one-size-fits-all) instead of local factors.106And as it was obvious, the 
crisis started locally and then expanded globally. 
Furthermore, one of the questions is whether the Basel requirements are costly for 
banks? The introduction of stricter capital and liquidity requirements affected the 
ability of banks to generate an adequate return on their equity which can lead to 
loosing shareholder and overall sustainability.107 In the recent study by McKinsey was 
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estimated the compliance costs of Basel. For instance, for one mid-sized European 
bank, these are put up to 200 full-time jobs. Moreover, given that Europe has around 
350 banks with a total asset over 1 billion euros means 70,000 new full jobs in order to 
comply with Basel requirements.108  
Also, there are critics when it comes to TLAC and MREL as they impose a requirement 
to issue subordinated liabilities that can be bailed out in times of crisis. However, the 
cost of these additional funds can vary significantly across countries and create 
competitive biases, especially for G-SIBs which are operating in different countries 
where cost of funding can also be different. Hence, it creates incentives for G-SIBs to 
move to the countries where the cost of funding is the lowest or to set up a holding 
company.109 
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Conclusion 
The crisis revealed several flaws in the institutional structures, regulation and 
supervisory system of the financial system. The effect of the crisis has weighted heavily 
on the economic growth, financial stability and bank performance in many 
jurisdictions. Consequently, the fall of the mortgage market had produced a 
widespread deficiency of liquidity and credit and affected many borrowers, taxpayers 
and overall working class.  Hence, regulators were confronted with highly leveraged 
banks, opacity of balance sheet and excessive risk taking. 
As can be seen from above, the decades prior to the crisis had an important effect. 
Insufficient capital rules, the procyclicality of banking regulations and the inadequate 
treatment of the over the counter derivative transactions set a pace for the subprime 
bubble and securitisation. 
After the initial shock and bail-outs, the necessary changes were needed to be made. 
In the USA was brought the Dodd-Frank Act while the EU was turned toward structural 
changes and strengthening of monetary policy. 
Hence, regulators responded to the crisis by reforming the global prudential 
framework and enhancing prudential supervision. The aim is to increase bank’s 
resilience through stronger capital and liquidity buffers. Also, through the recovery and 
resolution reforms goal is to reduce the possibility that the failure of banks has a 
spillover on the broader economy and taxpayers.  
These reforms significantly increased capital requirement, introduced new liquidity 
and leverage requirements, reduced the possibility for banks to use their own internal 
models and increased requirement in terms of loss absorbing capacity of major banks.
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